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To begin with, I must thank Ian Steedman for reviewing my book (Palermo 2004) in this Journal, thus extending its readership to 
an international public despite the fact that the book is in Italian. I 
am also fortunate that the review is very critical, as this gives me an 
opportunity to assess the validity of  my argument through the severe 
critique of  an inﬂuential personality in the economic ﬁeld.
Steedman (2004) opens his critique by noticing a number of  appar-
ent contradictions : is the book about economics or about politics ? 
Is it intended for laymen or professional economists ? Is it a purely 
vulgarizing work or a contribution to scientiﬁc research ? Following, 
he explains why the book is disappointing from a strictly scientiﬁc 
viewpoint. He argues that the theories featured in the book are rather 
unoriginal, that there are grave omissions, and that the book is boring 
and annoying (these latter features being, one might argue, character-
istic of  most ‘good’ books of  economics). ﬁnally, Steedman criticises 
my political proposal for being vague and insuﬃciently articulated. 
This as far as substance is concerned. Form, he asserts, is uselessly 
colourful and essentially redundant. 
. For whom the book is intended
The book analyses the rising of  neoliberal thought in economic 
theory and in political debate. The main argument is that economic 
theory provides an apparent scientiﬁc support to the myth of  the 
‘free market’ and contributes to establish neoliberalism as dominant 
culture. The problem is that, upon more careful scrutiny, this support 
proves itself  to be inadequate. The gradual disappearance of  a critical 
attitude in scientiﬁc research paves the way, on a political level, for the 
rising of  a pensée unique that claims to be a-political and scientiﬁcally 
neutral. This is a serious impediment to the discussion of  any other 
possible world. My criticism is directed mainly at the neo-liberal left 
wing, which a-critically accepts the myth of  the market and thus re-
nounces any radical claim against neo-liberal policies and capitalis-
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tic rationale. This critique of  neoliberal theories concerns not only 
their internal consistency and the plausibility of  their assumptions, 
but their ideological and moral premises as well. The general goal is 
to demystify economic theory and its obstinate tendency to present 
as rational a world that is simply immoral, and as politically neutral 
policies that, in fact, serve party-interests. 
The book is intended for the layman, to whom it tries to provide 
the tools for a critical understanding of  economic theory. At the same 
time, however, it also challenges professional economists by inviting 
them to put their methodological (and ideological) prejudices aside, 
in an attempt to evaluate the theoretical solidity of  neoliberal pre-
scriptions, always presented in the political domain as the only pos-
sible and necessary solutions. Therefore, professional economists 
should not expect particularly original theoretical ﬁndings. The 
challenge is instead in renouncing the impossible objective of  scien-
tiﬁc neutrality, understood as independence from moral and political 
questions (which, notwithstanding the criticisms of  Gunnar Myrdal 
and Maurice Dobb, remains the illusion of  every good neoclassical 
economist), and in explicitly discussing the complex relationships be-
tween economics, ideology, ethics and politics.
Steedman’s criticism of  this attempt at critical vulgarisation is 
particularly interesting. Indeed, my critic has succeeded in the am-
bitious attempt to read the book both as layman and as economist. 
His conclusion is that « the « lettore commune » will ﬁnd it really hard 
going, while the well-trained economic theorist may well ﬁnd that it 
swings between being boring and being annoying » (Steedman 2004, 
23). Fortunately for me, Steedman’s judgment is not unanimously 
shared : the book has been positively reviewed in two Italian newspa-
pers, il manifesto and Liberazione, and has been favourably received by 
independent radios, social centres, trade union exponents and by the 
radical components of  the student movement. My impression is that 
the book has been well received mainly by non-professionals whereas 
those who have found it frustrating are mainly academic economists. 
If  this is indeed the case, then doubtless it is the economist side of  
Steedman that must have prevailed. 
But let us ﬁrst take a look at why such a dangerous operation of  
critical vulgarisation was merited.
2. Motivations and objectives
Modern economic theory imposes a number of  technical and math-
ematical barriers that restrict economic discourse to an expert public, 
impeding widespread participation in economic and political debates. 
Il mito del mercato globale. Reply to Ian Steedman 123
The paradox is that, notwithstanding these obstacles, there is an in-
creasing inclination on the part of  political forces and movements 
towards economic and social issues. In other words, while mass so-
cial and political movements turn to economic reality, they are at the 
same time deprived of  the tools to understand economic theory. This 
complex process is not only about common citizens losing touch 
with scientiﬁc theory. It is more importantly about the way in which 
economists lose touch with the needs of  common persons, by ignor-
ing the demands of  social and political movements, which do not nec-
essarily obey the axioms (or the dogmas) of  economic theory.
The problem is that orthodox economics has become imperme-
able to any radical criticism that does not accept its scientiﬁc code. 
By becoming hegemonic both at a scientiﬁc level and within general 
culture, neoliberalism is no longer considered as what it truly is : the 
theoretical fruit of  particular schools of  thought with their own par-
ticular ideological and methodological premises. Today, neoliberal 
economic theory is the economic theory and its prescriptions appear 
as the logical deduction of  purely objective and indisputable scientiﬁc 
facts. In reality, however, this is but an appearance. In this book, I sim-
ply remind the reader of  this fact, and from this, I construct a political 
argument.
In this sense, I believe that Toni Negri, the author of  the preface, 
is right to claim that it is an essentially political work (developed 
through a critique of  economic theory). In fact, my constant goal 
throughout, far from limiting my criticism to the moral condemna-
tion of  the eﬀects of  neo-liberal policies (which in itself  is not produc-
tive), has been to develop a political argument as well. Clearly, my 
political positions may be judged in a number of  ways. Yet, from a 
strictly scientiﬁc point of  view, I ﬁnd it comforting that a critic, who 
can hardly be accused of  avarice in his review, has chosen to insist on 
scant originality, not on lack of  scientiﬁc rigour. I surely repeat al-
ready known things, but it is precisely on them that I build my politi-
cal reasoning. Therefore, Steedman’s remark that these results can be 
taken for granted on a scientiﬁc basis does not weaken my argument, 
but reinforces it.
3. Things that everybody knows…
The point, then, is not that the book repeats things that economists 
already know, but that non-economists generally do not know these 
things. This has important political implications. Steedman ob-
serves :
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Few economists will need to read Palermo to learn that Paretian eﬃciency is con-
sistent with extreme inequality. […] It is far from self-evident that GE theory and 
Paretian welfare economics will, of  themselves, persuade anyone (who really un-
derstands them) of  any wide-ranging political and economic policy standpoint. […] 
Economists will learn little from the discussions of  increasing returns, externalities 
and public goods. 
(Steedman 2004, 24)
In short, nothing new – for economists.  And yet, in the name of  ef-
ﬁciency, structural reforms, changes in the rules of  the game, dereg-
ulation, privatizations and ﬂexibility (of  workers) are all prescribed. 
But no economist mentions that, precisely because eﬃciency and ine-
qualities are perfectly compatible, one might also contemplate Pareto 
ineﬃcient interventions in order to ﬁght hunger and poverty. Econo-
mists do not surely need Palermo, but common readers perhaps need 
economists. Instead, they remain silent.
The theory of  market failures (in more or less sophisticated ver-
sions) is often invoked by anti-trust and other regulating agencies, 
and is used to ﬁx the relations between the state and the market. 
However, economists and public opinion do not at all have the same 
notion of  market failures. For common mortals, the market fails 
when it produces situations in which the most elementary needs are 
not satisﬁed ; not when it fails to reach Pareto eﬃciency, a concept un-
known to most. People believe that economic policy serves to solve 
the concrete problems of  the world. Economists however think that 
it serves to solve their own theoretical problems : the attainment of  
Pareto eﬃciency. Moral philosophers have repeatedly pointed out the 
weakness of  this normative criterion. But this has little relevance. In 
the political arena, the most authoritative voice remains that of  the 
economist.
The question of  market failures is also related to the signiﬁcance 
of  the general equilibrium model. Steedman assumes that theoreti-
cal results reached in this ﬁeld can be taken for granted. However, 
if  we consider, for instance, the impossibility to demonstrate unic-
ity and stability of  equilibrium (Sonnenschein 973) (which according 
to Steedman (2004, 23) should not be explained to common read-
ers because it is too hard going), the question arises : why do econo-
mists continue to teach a model that is useless from both positive and 
normative viewpoints ? And why should one pay such attention to 
welfare theorems, given that they involve equilibrium conditions that 
perhaps will never be attained ? But, above all, how can one uphold 
. Although Steedman’s phrase « who really understands them » in fact suggests that not all 
economists necessarily understand the implications of  their theories.
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that the political debate should start from a premise, that of  market 
eﬃciency, which is invalid both in reality and in the model ?
It is not up to me to judge whether the general equilibrium model 
is mainly taught from a critical perspective, by pointing out its intrin-
sic limits (as great neoclassical economists such as Frank Hahn and 
Lionel McKenzie do). However, it is easy to see that modern econom-
ics textbooks devote more pages to technicalities than to criticism. 
There is an increasing demand among students for critical analysis 
and for a greater awareness regarding the choice of  the theories to 
study (the ‘post-autistic movement’ being a notable example). On the 
other side of  the barricade, we assist instead in the death of  critique 
both in teaching and in scientiﬁc research. Students are asked to solve 
useless and ridiculous mathematical exercises and to know ﬁx-point 
theorems and eﬃciency conditions. For theoretical and methodologi-
cal criticism and issues of  moral philosophy there is simply no time. 
Needless to say, time will lack even more when our students become 
researchers and professors.
4. …but that still surprise
Until now we have accepted Steedman’s assumption that economists 
do in fact know economic theory. But is this really true ? Steedman 
writes ironically :
[Economists] will be surprised to learn that for the « economista borghese » the im-
portance of  an individual in society is given by his ability to spend and that the « teo-
ria economica borghese » gives no importance to the distribution of  income. They 
may also ﬁnd it odd that Palermo discusses the two theorems of  welfare economics 
but not compensation criteria or cost-beneﬁt analysis (both open to criticism, of  
course). 
(Steedman 2004, 24)
In the market, we all know, collective decisions are a consequence 
of  individual choices. If  the basket of  goods X, rather than Y, is pro-
duced, it is because, through individual demands, society expresses 
its preference for X over Y. How does this process of  aggregation 
of  individual preferences occur ? Simple : by giving each individual a 
number of  voting rights that is proportional to her purchasing power. 
In the market, the implicit voting system is well known (or at least I 
thought) and is based on the principle ‘one dollar-one vote’. There-
fore, and this might come as a surprise for Steedman, in the market 
individuals are not all equal, but count precisely in proportion to their 
ability to spend. 
However, from a theoretical perspective, the real problem is not 
that the market mechanism is antidemocratic. This is a fact, which 
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does not depend on theory but on reality. The problem is that eco-
nomic theory takes this antidemocratic principle as the foundation 
of  its normative framework, that is to say it applies it to the study 
of  what ought to be and not only to the study of  what is. Welfare eco-
nomics, of  course, considers diﬀerent distributive conﬁgurations (im-
plying diﬀerent distributions of  voting rights). But, in deﬁning social 
desirability, it does not admit that individual preferences might be ag-
gregated according to other criteria than the ‘one dollar-one vote’, 
which, accidental cases apart, is non-democratic. With this implicit 
normative criterion, economic theory makes its policy prescriptions, 
the fruit of  complex mathematical elaborations that only the econo-
mist can understand, and consigns them to politics (perhaps it is also 
for this reason that economists get so nervous when the same old 
rebels, who are not even able to make derivatives, pretend to ques-
tion the rationality of  their prescriptions). A judgement of  fact (it is 
a fact that the market works according to the principle ‘one dollar-
one vote’) is transformed into a judgement of  value (only that which 
respects this principle is desirable), a process which, as David Hume 
reminded some century ago, is methodologically unsound.
The contradiction between the supposed neutrality of  normative 
economics and its all but neutral moral premises is particularly evi-
dent in the theory of  social choice. Social choice theory imposes a 
number of  minimal moral conditions on criteria that deﬁne social 
desirability (in particular, it assumes the ‘one head-one vote’ princi-
ple), conditions that instead welfare economics ignores (and violates). 
As is well known, then, these minimal moral premises turn out to be 
incompatible with Pareto eﬃciency (Arrow’s impossibility theorem). 
Yet the economist is not surprised by this, nor does he care. Only 
Pareto eﬃciency matters to him. The rest is politics, not science.
It is irrelevant if, in the market, Pareto eﬃciency is obtained by 
renouncing the moral principle that wants all individuals to have the 
same weight in society. The thesis is important, not the assumptions. 
And the thesis stipulates that perfectly competitive markets are Pare-
to eﬃcient (even though, by assumption, they are non-democratic). 
With this, I clearly do no wish to charge the economist with the re-
sponsibility of  upholding a system that pays in democracy the price 
of  eﬃciency. This is just capitalism (and the fact that capitalism is in 
fact eﬃcient is an entirely diﬀerent question). The economist’s re-
sponsibility lies instead in his construction of  a normative framework 
that pretends to be neutral and impartial, yet that presupposes a vot-
ing system that does not respect the most elementary principles of  
democracy.
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Furthermore, the problem is aggravated by the fact that Pareto cri-
terion is also generally applied out of  the context of  the two welfare 
theorems (as it could otherwise never be applied, given that welfare 
theorems rest on quite unrealistic assumptions). This means that 
distribution is viewed as a given not in a merely abstract sense (as a 
methodological choice that allows for comparisons between diﬀerent 
distributive conﬁgurations), but also in a very concrete sense, since 
existing distribution is taken as given (remember that neoclassical the-
ory admits redistribution only within the context of  the two welfare 
theorems). I do not know whether economists are truly surprised by 
this. What is surely unsurprising is that status quo defenders invoke 
the neutrality of  this criterion.
At this point, however, compensation criteria come to the econo-
mist’s aid. These criteria, which I have not discussed in the book, al-
low the economist to provide normative prescriptions even when the 
Pareto criterion tout court does not. It is all but clear, according to the 
literature, whether this kind of  stratagem in fact solves the problem 
or rather creates new ones that are even more serious (as suggested 
by theoretical paradoxes that can occur when one follows this theo-
retical path). But I do not see how these attempts to enlarge the ap-
plicability of  welfare economics can solve the contradiction between 
Pareto eﬃciency and democracy, considering that, just as the Pareto 
principle tout court, they are based on the ‘one dollar-one vote’ prin-
ciple.
5. Omissions and selection criteria
Steedman’s criticism of  this omission oﬀers me the possibility to ex-
plain the criteria I used to select the theories discussed in the book 
(actually Steedman points out other omissions too, such as growth 
models, intertemporal choice models, resource-extraction theory). 
Firstly, I privilege the theories that defend the general rationality of  
the market : the general equilibrium model as far as the neoclassical 
school is concerned ; the Hayekian conception of  competition as far 
as the Austrian School is concerned. Starting from these ‘classical’ 
references, I then analyse the theoretical developments that provide 
straightforward criteria for state intervention, while preserving the 
general neo-liberal conception of  these classical references : the theo-
ry of  market failures and its developments. ﬁnally, in a very selective 
way, I discuss a number of  theories that depart from the hard core of  
neoclassical economics. I consider, in particular, some developments 
of  new institutional economics, of  new Keynesian economics and of  
the radical school, primarily because of  the sympathy they receive 
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from a scientiﬁc left wing already accustomed to the myth of  the 
market.
Concerning compensation criteria and cost-beneﬁt analysis, I will 
clarify brieﬂy here how I apply these criteria, as I have discussed these 
theories also in a scientiﬁc article (Gloria-Palermo and Palermo 2005). 
It is evident that these theoretical contributions have an important 
impact on the scientiﬁc debate and further articulate the normative 
discourse with respect to the two fundamental theorems of  welfare 
economics. In a paper on the role of  value judgements in economic 
theory, I explain, shortly after the discussion on welfare theorems, the 
logic of  compensation criteria and cost-beneﬁt analysis and the prob-
lems that these theoretical developments encounter. From a scientiﬁc 
viewpoint, my attempt is to show that these developments of  neo-
classical economics do not at all reinforce the neoliberal conception, 
and that, on the contrary, they depend on it (and therefore crumble 
with it as soon as the general foundations of  welfare economics turn 
out to be weak). Their discussion is necessary when one addresses a 
specialised public that wishes to see all theoretical developments ex-
amined. However, their omission is appropriate when one addresses 
a non-specialised public that ‘simply’ wishes to understand what lies 
behind the myth of  the market, by following the central ideological 
thread and without getting lost in the details of  its many theoretical 
developments (which in any case presuppose the consistency of  the 
main thought).
6. Radical theory, neoliberal left wing, 
and NO-GLOBAL movement
Steedman is right when he notices that the chapter in which I propose 
a course of  action toward another possible world, made of  socialism 
and democracy, is general and insuﬃciently developed considering 
the many practical problems that such a prospect engenders. This, ac-
cording to Steedman (2004, 25), is a negative fact in itself, and brings 
him to describe this part of  the book as « predictably depressing ». Also 
in this case, however, Steedman does not criticise my reasoning for its 
eventual weakness or imprecision, but because it answers a diﬀerent 
question from his own. Steedman would like to have precise solu-
tions to concrete problems and, instead, as he correctly predicts, this 
chapter does not oﬀer this. My choice, however, is perfectly coherent 
with the political motivations of  the work. Thus, Steedman rejects 
the legitimacy of  my scientiﬁc and political questioning without hav-
ing properly understood the intentions of  the book itself.
The book has a simple yet fundamental objective : to shed light on 
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the logic and the values that guide neoliberal policies. This, in my 
view, is an indispensable (although probably insuﬃcient) premise for 
a radical reconsideration of  the capitalist logic of  social interaction. 
There is no attempt to trivialise economic and political problems 
through the prescription of  universal recipes or through an abstract 
construction of  the perfect world. I have no pretence of  establishing 
the laws of  communism or of  indicating the way for taking the power 
in the world, or in a single country, for that matter. Indeed, politi-
cal discussion must be open, and social movements, political parties, 
trade unions and other social subjects are already active parts of  such 
a discussion. Of  course, within this context, I have my personal con-
victions and I am willing to defend them in a political debate. But I 
see no particular reason why they should play a special role in the 
deﬁnition of  a well-articulated political proposal. A well-developed 
proposal cannot neglect social and political forces, existing and po-
tential alliances, historical tendencies, strategic objectives and many 
other factors, which, at best, can only be sketched out in my work. 
From a political stance, my hope is that demystiﬁcation of  economic 
theory might help in determining the relations of  compatibility (and 
incompatibility) between scientiﬁc and political forces of  the critical 
left wing. Perhaps this is not enough to meet Steedman’s expecta-
tions. But if  my book has contributed to these ‘minimal’ goals, I do 
not ﬁnd it depressing at all.
The radical theory of  Bowles and Gintis is a clear example of  the 
dangers of  those attempts to develop theoretical and political propos-
als without an adequate criticism of  the underlying theoretical mod-
el. That their approach is at the same time an internal criticism and 
an extension of  the general equilibrium model is not, as Steedman 
suggests, my personal opinion ; the authors themselves label their ap-
proach « post Walrasian political economy » (Bowles and Gintis 993). 
Their main objective is to show that, even in a general equilibrium 
framework, power relations exist. However, it is clear that once one 
has accepted the methodological premises of  neoclassical theory, 
methodological individualism above all, post-Walrasian economics 
can hardly get rid of  them. Power relations are thus understood as 
interpersonal relations, and their social dimension is cast aside, for, 
according to methodological individualism, social relations do not ex-
ist (if  not as the sum of  interpersonal relations). If  I criticise this ap-
proach, it is not because I underscore the contribution of  the authors 
to radical political economics ; it is because it incorporates all the con-
tradictions inherent in the attempts to develop a radical perspective 
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by accepting the neo-liberal conception implicit in neoclassical meth-
odological premises.
Until now we have been concerned with criticisms regarding the 
substance of  my book. There is also the question of  expositional 
form, that « purple prose » (Steedman 2004, 23, 24) so diﬀerent from 
the way economists write in journals among themselves, which has 
served to further irritate my critic. The rules of  oﬃcial scientiﬁc pub-
lications are well known : few words (and many mathematical sym-
bols), absolute freedom in choosing assumptions and apparent ter-
minological and scientiﬁc neutrality. In this book, on the contrary, I 
do not use mathematics (because I do not need it) and I even use ‘too 
many’ words, as I take positions on ethical and political grounds as 
well. This being said, my prose, certainly disrespectful of  the rules 
imposed by scientiﬁc reviews, is very useful for me in openly discuss-
ing with common readers and with subjects interested in economic 
issues and involved in social struggles, who are scared by mathemat-
ics, not by politics. It is as a militant of  a wide movement hostile to 
neo-liberalism but also, to a large extent, openly anti-capitalistic and 
communist, that I have felt the need to critically discuss the absolute 
truths of  economic theory. The choice of  expositional form is a direct 
consequence of  the kind of  debate in which the book intervenes and 
of  the kind of  reader to which the book is addressed.
Some economists believe that adherence to the expositional (and 
methodological) code of  orthodox theory is the price to pay to take 
part in academic debate. They wish to discuss with orthodoxy and 
thus accept its language and method. As a reward, if  they are clev-
er enough, they are given access to the most prestigious scientiﬁc 
reviews. My approach is similar but symmetrical : I fully accept the 
principle that the choice of  the reader deﬁnes the expositional code, 
but I do not accept that my sole interlocutors will be my (scientiﬁc) 
opponent. I do not shy away from a confrontation with economic 
orthodoxy, but the true reason why I study economics is surely not to 
publish in the American Economic Review. 
Theoretical research should not dissociate itself  from real changes. 
Nor can it withdraw into itself  as if  the world ended at the gates of  
our universities. Outside of  academics, the political debate is heated 
and the critique is radical. It is up to us, academic economists, to con-
front and discuss with social subjects who criticise us and who would 
like to change the world. And yet the great majority of  economists 
remain convinced that this does not concern them. It is with some 
disappointment that I take note that Steedman, too, believes that 
vulgarisation and critique are incompatible and that economics and 
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politics are separate disciplines. And here I thought I had written an 
accessible critique of  political economy.2
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